Best of LinkedIn: ICT & Tech CW 45/46 2026

Critical systems are more connected than ever, yet few organisations can say what they depend on. Post-quantum migration now has firm dates, while a federal review found that agencies lag on inventories and testing. Sovereignty has moved from where data sits to who controls it, and outages show how one shared dependency can reach many organisations at once. The same ownership gap appears in operational technology, where unsupported devices and supplier access sit outside the view of security teams.
Date
November 20, 2026
ICT & Tech Insights
Thomas Allgeyer

Methodology: Every two weeks we collect most relevant posts on LinkedIn for selected topics and create an overall summary only based on these posts. If you´re interested in the single posts behind, you can find them here: https://linktr.ee/thomasallgeyer. Have a great read!

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Post-quantum gets firm dates

  • NIST IR 8547 deprecates RSA and ECDSA after 2030 and disallows them after 2035, which turns a vague threat into a schedule.
  • US federal high-impact systems face post-quantum key establishment by end of 2030 and digital signatures by end of 2031.
  • AES and SHA-2/SHA-3 stay in place, so the break is confined to structured public-key math such as RSA and elliptic curves.
  • Attackers can harvest encrypted data now and decrypt it later, so waiting for a working quantum computer is not a safe plan.
  • Past crypto migrations have taken 10 to 20 years, which makes the dates tight for long-lived data.

The inventory and execution gap

  • The GAO reviewed 24 major federal agencies, and only one fully addressed building a prioritized inventory of vulnerable cryptography.
  • None of the 24 agencies had tested post-quantum cryptography in their own environment, and none fully identified the funding required for migration.
  • The gap is execution rather than standards or technology, because organisations cannot budget for what they have not inventoried.
  • Regulators are moving toward inventory milestones, such as SAMA's Q4 2026 cryptographic asset identification step and a Q1 2027 enterprise quantum risk assessment.
  • The term quantum-ready has no standard definition, while PCI DSS Requirement 12.3.3 already demands an up-to-date inventory of cryptographic cipher suites and protocols.

Post-quantum beyond the algorithm

  • Replacing an algorithm is the easy part, because financial infrastructure depends on it across payment networks, signatures and cross-border connections.
  • Quantum-resistant network encryption alone leaves application data, signatures, tokens and software artifacts exposed.
  • Chip implementation matters, since quantum sensors can detect electromagnetic signals leaking from chips running ML-KEM in a side-channel attack.
  • Long-lived operational technology devices and procurement clauses need particular attention, because they sit outside secure data centres.
  • Telecom operators need to map ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and SHA-3 onto specific 5G network interfaces to counter harvest now, decrypt later.
  • Long-lived AI training data and proprietary models raise the stakes and call for cryptographic agility in data infrastructure.

Quantum hardware enters production

  • A Diraq quantum computer with an eight-qubit silicon chip was installed in an Equinix data centre, fitting standard racks and drawing under 20kW.
  • Scaling to higher qubit counts on that system needs only a chip replacement, with no change to the surrounding infrastructure.
  • Funding grew to $10.9 billion and commercially available processors rose from 40 to 56, according to the 2026 MIT Quantum Index Report.
  • IBM announced a $10 billion quantum investment over five years and remains on track to launch IBM Quantum Starling in 2029.
  • Hardware success depends on fabrication volume, yield and materials discipline, since quantum demand is still counted in dozens of chips.
  • Algorithmic advances cut estimated Shor's algorithm hardware requirements by over 40,000x, so software may bring practical utility sooner than expected.

Quantum networking needs scale

  • Quantum links are still operated by hand, and scaling through quantum switching requires a move to machine-scale operations.
  • A full network stack is proposed to scale machines with hundreds of qubits toward fault-tolerant systems with hundreds of thousands to millions.
  • Entanglement swapping was demonstrated over 17.6 km of deployed fiber, a step toward interconnected quantum computers.
  • Quantum secure communications will scale only if embedded in existing network hardware at prices matching classical equipment.
  • Securing one fibre link at a cost of 100k+ euros leaves no business case for most enterprises.

Sovereignty means control

  • A European data centre shows where data sits, not who can compel access to it.
  • Under the US CLOUD Act, providers under US jurisdiction can be required to hand over data they control, wherever it is stored.
  • That exposure includes companies only controlled by a US parent, so European hosting does not change it.
  • A five-minute vendor test asks who owns the vendor, who holds the encryption keys, and whether you can leave freely.
  • In an analysis of 1,475 Nordic public websites, only 13 were fully digitally sovereign, and Google fonts and analytics were common dependencies.
  • Sovereignty and innovation can coexist, as the SAP sovereign cloud agreement with the Dutch Ministry of Defence shows.

Outages expose shared dependencies

  • The Microsoft outage affected organisations in more than 70 countries, including banks, government agencies and courts.
  • Poland's digital minister responded by outlining open-source software plans for public administration.
  • Cloud alone is not a continuity strategy, and sovereignty is tested when access to critical services disappears.
  • A router change on one remote line flooded the FAA network with 1,000+ connection attempts every few seconds and grounded flights nationwide.
  • One router at one remote site should never be able to take down a national system, which makes segmentation, rate limiting and blast-radius containment essential.
  • Gaps in change validation, failure isolation and rollback procedures turn small changes into systemic availability risk.

Ownership gaps in OT

  • Attackers took control of supermarket refrigeration controllers across at least seven European countries, and some freezers hit 50°C.
  • The same technique hit around 700 supermarkets in France the month before and caused fires at several stores.
  • Attacks came through internet-facing interfaces, end-of-life firmware and supplier remote access outside the security team's view.
  • VulnCheck disclosed 14 vulnerabilities in unsupported XWEB EVO refrigeration supervisors, with two already seeing opportunistic exploitation attempts.
  • Hospital building management systems show the same pattern, because facilities, IT and contractors each hold a piece and nobody owns security.
  • Japan's emergency cybersecurity package of about $63 million treats cyber resilience as a national capability that reaches across supply chains.
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Frequently asked questions

What changed in ICT and tech infrastructure risk in November 2026?

Infrastructure is changing faster than visibility into it. NIST IR 8547 deprecates RSA and ECDSA after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. The GAO found that only 1 of 24 federal agencies fully addressed a cryptography inventory, and none had tested post-quantum cryptography in their own environment.

What are the three questions to spot sovereign washing in cloud deals?

Ask who legally owns the vendor, who holds the encryption keys, and whether you can leave freely. A European data centre only shows where data sits. Under the US CLOUD Act, providers under US jurisdiction can be required to hand over data they control, including companies only controlled by a US parent.

How did a router change ground flights across the US?

A contractor moved one remote line from copper to fiber, and the router on that line flooded the FAA network. It sent 1,000+ connection attempts every few seconds and overloaded switches and routers. The result was a nationwide ground stop, which shows why segmentation and rate limiting matter.

Want to see the posts voices behind this summary?

This week’s roundup (CW 45/ 46) brings you the Best of LinkedIn on ICT & Tech:

→ 70 handpicked posts that cut through the noise

→ 40 fresh voices worth following

→ 1 deep dive you don’t want to miss